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THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY:
COALITION PROOF EQUILIBRIUM IN INFINITE GAMES
I. Introduction
Recently Greenberg [6,7,8] has used the von Neumann-Morgenstern [13]
notion of stable sets as a framework for examining and comparing game
theoretic solution concepts. The idea of a stable set applies to any abstract
system of objects with an arbitrary dominance relation defined on the set. It
partitions the objects into two subsets -- which can be denoted "good" and
"bad" -- with the property of internal stability (no element of the good set
is dominated by another) and external stability (every element of the bad set
is dominated by some element of the good set)
.
By varying the type of objects that constitute potential candidates for a
solution (such as strategy- tuples or coalitional arrangements), and the nature
of the dominance relation among them, the analysis can reflect alternative
assumptions about the environment in which the game is played. The approach
allows systematic extension of known solution concepts to new and difficult
contexts. For example, the approach is of use in defining renegotiation proof
equilibria in repeated games (Asheim [1], Asilis, Kahn and Mookherjee [2]) and
in extending cooperative solutions to games with private information
(Boyd-Prescott [4], Myerson [12], Marimon [11], and Kahn-Mookherj ee [9,10]).
A difficulty with the approach is that a stable set can only be
guaranteed to exist for finite abstract systems. For example, Greenberg [7]
demonstrates that the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium proposed by
Bernheim- Peleg- Whinston [3] can be characterized by the stable set of an
abstract system of coalitional agreements with a suitable dominance relation
-- so long as a stable set exists. We provide examples with infinite action
spaces where the stable does not exist and the equivalence breaks down. Thus
the approach might seem of limited usefulness in economic contexts, where
players typically have an infinite number of actions available.
The aim of this paper is to suggest procedures for extending the stable
set approach to games with infinite action spaces and/or infinite numbers of
players. We employ two procedures. The first follows Roth's [14]
generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution concept, using a
tripartite division of the objects in the abstract system. This "semi-stable
partition" exists for any abstract system, finite or infinite. The second
procedure involves modifying the objects examined in the abstract system, by
developing a notion of "near- rationality" of coalitional actions.
We illustrate the two procedures by applying them to the case of
Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) . We show that there is a unique
semi-stable partition of Greenberg's abstract system for any finite player
game. From this partition, we generate a non- recursive definition of
coalition-proof equilibrium (S-CPNE). For finite player games we show that
this non-recursive equilibrium concept is a subset of the set of equilibria
according to B-P-W's recursive definition. With infinite action spaces, the
recursive definition can generate intuitively unreasonable outcomes; in these
cases our non recursive concept provides a useful refinement.
However, we also provide examples where recursive CPNE are unreasonable
and the S-CPNE fails to exist, despite the existence of "intuitively
reasonable" outcomes of the game. This problem arises when the set of
self -enforcing agreements is open. We show that the set may be open even in a
game with compact strategy spaces and continuous payoffs. Our second
procedure handles this difficulty, by modeling "near- rationality " for
coalitions. We model coalitions as choosing not single action- tuples , but
convergent sequences of actions, with payoffs defined by the limit points of
these sequences. The interpretation is that they choose actions "sufficiently
far along" these sequences, thus gaining little by going to the limit.
With this modified formulation of the set of coalitional agreements, the
stable partition exists in any finite player game. From this stable
partition, we derive an "extended" notion of coalition proof equilibrium
(ES-CPNE), which provides the desired refinement of the B-P-W definition.
We also provide an alternative, recursive definition of ES-CPNE.
Since the stable sets approach does not depend on finite recursions on
the set of players, it is the natural candidate for extension to the infinite
player case. Although the stable set need not be unique when the number of
players is infinite, the minimal stable set can be easily characterized. We
therefore propose as the natural extension a "strong" coalition proof
equilibrium, corresponding to Roth's "supercore" and characterized as
belonging to every stable set.
A natural economic application for a game with an infinite number of
players is any situation with free entry. The procedures we develop here have
proved particularly useful in applications to market games with imperfect
information (see Kahn-Mookherj ee [10]).
II. Simple Agreements
Let N be the (possibly infinite) set of players, with i£N denoting a
typical player. Let A
,
U respectively denote the strategy space and payoff
i i
functions of i and let A = Y „ A , and U : A -» R.A iGN i i
Define an agreement to be a pair (a,S) where a 6 A and S is a non-empty
subset of N. Let A denote the set of all agreements.
Note that an agreement specifies actions for all players, not just those
in S. The reader may find it helpful to interpret an agreement as specifying
the actions for the parties to the agreement, given the actions of other
players
.
Agreement (b,S) dominates agreement (a,T) (denoted (b,S) > (a,T) ) if
(i) S C T
(ii) a = b for all j £ N\S
j j
(iii) U (b) > U (a) for all i e S.
i 1
In other words, a dominating agreement is one in which a subset of the
original parties break away and find actions which are strictly better for all
of the subset, the rest of the players leaving their actions unchanged.
The pair (G,B) is a stable partition of the set of agreements A -- where
G denotes the stable set of "good" agreements, and B denotes its complement,
the set of "bad" agreements -- if
(a,T) e B « There exists (b,S) 6 G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
(a,T) e G <=• There does not exist (b,S) E G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
In other words, every agreement in G is dominated only by agreements in B, and
2
every agreement in B is dominated by some agreement in G.
It is not clear that a stable partition always exists, or if it does,
whether it is unique. However, if a stable partition (G,B) does exist, it
generates a solution concept in the following way: the set of solutions to the
game is the set of strategy vectors a such that (a,N) is in the set G.
In the case of a finite number of players and strategies, it can be shown
that there always exists a unique partition; this is established below. But in
finite -player , infinite - strategy games, a stable partition may not exist.
Example 1 Consider a one player game N = (i), A = (0,1) and U (a ) = a .
i iii
If G is non-empty, it must contain a single agreement -- otherwise one
agreement in G will dominate another. Let G = ((a ,(i))). Then (a +c,{i))eB,
i i
and therefore must be dominated by some agreement in G , a contradiction. G
cannot be empty, because then every agreement would be in B , and by definition
every agreement in B must be dominated by some agreement in G.B
Example 1 would no longer hold if the player had a compact strategy
space. But with more players, this problem may arise even with compact
strategy spaces and continuous utility functions.
Example 2 Suppose N = (1,2,3), A = [0,1] for all i and
i
U (a
,
a
,
a ) = a - I a -a I112 3 2 ' 1 2
U (a ,a ,a ) = 2a - a - la -a I
2 12 3 1 3 ' 2 3 '
U(a,a,a)=2a -a - I a -a I ( 1-a +a ) .
3 12 3 1 2 1 3 ' 12
The best response correspondences are:
a (a
,
a ) = a12 3 2
a (a ,a ) = a and
2 13 3
a (a ,a ) - [0,1] if a = 1 and a =
3 12 1 2
a otherwise
.
l
Suppose there exists a stable partition {G,B}. First note that
((a , a , a ) , ( i ) ) G G if a G a (a ), where a denotes the strategy- tuple of123 ii-i - i
players other than i -- this is because such agreements cannot be dominated,
as i is playing a best response. Next, note that (a,N) G G implies a must be a
Nash equilibrium -- otherwise it can be dominated by a singleton-agreement
involving a best- response strategy. Hence (a,N) G G implies a - a - a .
We claim that there is no (a,N) G G. Suppose ((a,a,a),N) G G and
((b,b,b),N) G G with b > a; then the latter would dominate the former, a
contradiction. Suppose there is a unique a G [0,1] such that ((a,a,a),N) G G.
If a < 1, then it follows that ((a+e, a+e, a+e),N) G B, which requires
( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) to be dominated by some agreement in G. Clearly it cannot be
dominated by any singleton coalition agreement, nor by ((a,a,a),N). So
( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) must be dominated by some pair-coalition agreement. Suppose
it is dominated by ( (a ,0 , a+e ) , { 1 , 2 ) ) G G. For this it is necessary that a and
P both exceed a+e . But if @ > a+e , ( (a ,/3 , a+e ) , { 1 , 2 ) ) ls dominated by
( (a,a+e ,a+e ) , { 2 ) ) e G, contradicting the hypothesis that ( (<x,0, a+e) , { 1 , 2} ) GG .
Suppose, alternatively, that ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) is dominated by
( (a+e ,0,-y) , {
2
, 3 ) ) G G. This requires /9 = 7 < a+e, but a+e < 1 implies that
( (a+e ,0,7) , { 2 , 3 } ) is dominated by ( (a+e ,/9 , a+e ) , { 3 ) ) G G, a contradiction.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) cannot be
dominated by any agreement involving coalition (1,3).
It remains to consider the possibility that ((1,1,1),N) is the unique
agreement for N that is in G. But ((1,1,1) ,N) is dominated by
((1,0,0),(2,3))GG.
Hence there exists no (a,N) G G. For any a < 1, then, ((a,a,a),N) must be
in B, and therefore dominated by some agreement in G. Repeating the same
argument as for ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) , however, this can be ruled out.B
We now propose the following modification of the notion of a stable
partition. A semi - stable partition (G,U,B} of the set of agreements A -- into
a good set G, an ugly set U, and a bad set B - - is one where
(a,T) e B <=> There exists (b,S) G G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
(a,T) G G o (b,S) f> (a,T) only if (b,S) G B
U = A \ (G u B)
In other words B consists of all agreements dominated by agreements in G, and
G consists of all agreements which are not dominated, except possibly by
3
agreements in B.
A semi-stable partition is weaker than a stable partition in that the
good and the bad sets do not exhaust the set of all agreements: there may be
agreements that are neither good, nor bad. The following lemma establishes
some properties of this ugly set.
Lemma 1
:
(a). Any (a,S) in U is dominated by some (b,T) in U. Hence U is
either empty or infinite.
(b) . In finite player, finite-strategy games, U is empty. Hence a
semi-stable partition is a stable partition in such games.
(c) . (a,S) G U cannot be dominated by any (b,T) G G. Hence with compact
strategy sets and continuous utility functions, (a,N) G U implies a is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof (a) (a,S) G U must be dominated by some agreement (b,T), otherwise
it would be in G. If (b,T) G G then (a,S) would be in B instead. If (a.S) is
not dominated by another agreement in U, then (b,T) e B. But then (a,S) e G, a
contradiction.
(b) Follows from (a), since A is finite in finite games.
(c) is obvious.
Ugly sets are therefore "open" in the sense of containing infinite
sequences of agreements dominating one another, but none of which are
dominated by a good agreement. With compact strategy spaces and continuous
utility functions, they involve members of the coalition playing best
responses -- i.e., they are self -enforcing in the strict non-cooperative
sense
.
Theorem 1
;
A semi-stable partition always exists.
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Proof: Define:
G = ((a,S) e A | there is no (b,T) in A dominating (a,S))
B = l(c,V) 6 A | (c,V) is dominated by some (a,S) e G }
For any (finite or transfinite) ordinal a > 0, define B and G inductively
a a
given the definitions of G and B. for all < a:
P P
G = {(a,S) G A I there is no (b,T) in A - U B. dominating (a,S)
a p<a p
B = ((c,V) E A I (c,V) is dominated by some (a,S) G G )
a a
It is clear that /3 < a implies G. C G , and thus B. C B .pa pa
We first show that B n G =0 for all a. It is obvious for a = 0. Now
a a
suppose it is not true for some ordinal > 0. Then there must be a first such
ordinal. Call it a and let (a,S) e B n G . Thus (a,S) is dominated by someQ Q
(c,V) E G ; moreover (c,V) G B_, for some 8 < a . This means there is (b,T) G G„
a P 8
which dominates (c,V); this (b,T) must be in B for some 7 < a. Thus G„ n B
7 B 7
* 0. Let 6 be the larger of 8,-y. Then G n B * 0, contradicting the
6
assumption that a was the first such ordinal.
IAI
There are at most 2 distinct sets G so for some ordinal 7, G = G
a 7 7+1
Let U = A - (G u B ). We establish that {G ,U ,B } is a semi-stable
7 7 7 7 7 7
partition. By the above, the sets are disjoint. An agreement is in G if
and only if it is dominated only by agreements in LL .. B„ - B . AnJ j j b £<7+l 3 7
agreement is in B if and only if it is dominated by an agreement in G
The previous theorem gives an inductive procedure for generating a
semi-stable partition. The next theorem establishes that in a game with a
finite number of players there is no other serai-stable partition.
Theorem 2
:
For finite player games, the semi-stable partition is unique.
Proof
:
See appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 give rise to the following definition:
In a finite player game, a strategy vector a is a Semi - Stable Coalition
Proof Equilibrium (S-CPNE) if (a.N) G G in the semi-stable partition of
agreements
.
Corollary 1: Every strong equilibrium is an S-CPNE.
Proof
:
In the proof of theorem 1, the strategy vectors a such that (a,N)
is in G are precisely the strong equilibria.
It should be kept in mind that the existence of a CPNE is a separate
issue from the existence of a stable or semi-stable partition. A semi-stable
partition always exists, but it may be that no CPNE -- of either variety --
exists. In example 2, this is precisely the case: there is no (a,N) in the
good set of the semi-stable partition. All Nash equilibria of the form
((a, a, a), N) for a < 1 are in the ugly set, but ((1,1,1), N) is in the set B.
Obviously, when a stable partition exists, the equilibria it generates
are identical to the S-CPNE. We now explore the connection of S-CPNE with the
recursive definition of a CPNE due to B-P-W in the case of finite player
games .
Recursive Definition of CPNE
:
For any singleton coalition { i } , define a
to be optimal for (i) if i is playing a best response in a.
Having defined optimality for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
define optimality for a coalition S of size k (>2), as follows:
Say that a is self -enforcing for S if it is optimal for every TcS
.
Say that a is optimal for S if it is self -enforcing for S, and there does
not exist any b self -enforcing for S such that (b,S) dominates (a,S).
Finally, if N is finite, say that a is an R (recursive) -CPNE if a is
optimal for N.
The following example illustrates that the semi-stable partition is an
improvement on the stable partition. It shows that there are cases in which
the S-CPNE coincides with the R-CPNE, but there is no stable partition. Since
the S-CPNE is a strong equilibrium in this example, it also shows that
corollary 1 would fail to hold if we used stability rather than semi- stability
as the basis of the definition.
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Example 3: N= (1,2), A = [-2,1], A = [-1,1),
U (a
,
a ) = U (a , a ) =aa.112 2 12 12
In this example, strategy vector (-2,-1) strictly Pareto dominates all
other strategy vectors. Since it is self enforcing, it is the unique R-CPNE.
It is also the unique S-CPNE, since ((-2,-l),N) belongs to G
n
and dominates
any other agreement involving N. However there is no stable partition; for
example, agreements of the form ((1, a ),(2)) are neither good nor bad, by an
argument identical to that of example 1
In this example, the equilibrium is intuitively plausible, and the two
definitions coincide. In general the S-CPNE are a subset of the R-CPNE.
Theorem 3
:
In a finite player game, if a is a S-CPNE, it is a R-CPNE.
Proof Let (a,S) € G in a semi-stable partition. We use an inductive
method to establish that a is optimal for S. This is obviously true for any
singleton S. So suppose it is true for all coalitions of size not exceeding
k-1 , and let #S = k.
First, we establish that a is self -enforcing for S. If not, there exists
T C S for which a is not optimal. By the inductive hypothesis, (a,T) € G.
Therefore it is dominated by (b.V) g B. But then (b,V) dominates (a,S). This
contradicts (a,S) G G.
Next, we show there cannot be any d which is self -enforcing for S such
that (d,S) dominates (a,S). Suppose there is. Since (a,S) € G, (d,S) is in B.
We claim that there exists (e,S) € G which dominates (a,S), which would
lead to a contradiction. Since (d,S) e B, there exists (f,T) e G which
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dominates (d,S). If T C S, Che induction hypothesis implies f is optimal for
T. Then d cannot be optimal for T, contradicting the hypothesis that d is
self -enforcing for S. So we must have (f,S) e G which dominates (d,S) and
therefore also (a,S). Putting e = f, we are done.
The following theorems establish circumstances in which the S-CPNE and the
R-CPNE coincide:
Theorem 4 For finite player games, if a stable partition exists the
S-CPNE and R-CPNE coincide.
Proof : Given the result of Theorem 3, we only have to show that every
R-CPNE is an S-CPNE, i.e., if a is optimal for N, then (a,N) e G in the
semi-stable partition. By theorem 2, if a stable partition exists, the
serai-stable partition is stable. Any agreement in B is dominated by an
agreement in G and by Theorem 3 all agreements in G are optimal, so all
agreements in B are non optimal. Since these two sets exhaust the set of
agreements, the set G equals the set of optimal agreements.
In order to demonstrate the equivalence of the various versions of CPNE
we require that the stable partition exists. In one important case existence
is easily established:
Theorem 5: In any finite player, finite strategy game, a stable
partition exists.
Proof : By Theorem 1, a semi-stable partition exists, and by Lemma 1 (a)
the set U is empty.
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Next we provide an example where S-CPNE do not coincide with R-CPNE;
moreover, the latter is "unreasonable."
Example 4: N = (1,2), A - (0,1), A = [0,1),
—
-
1 2
U (a
,
a ) = U (a , a ) =aa.112 2 12 12
In this game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (0,0). Since this is the
only self -enforcing strategy vector for (1,2), it is optimal for (1,2), and
therefore a R-CPNE. We claim that (0,N) £ G. Suppose otherwise. Now (0,N) is
dominated by (a,N) where a a > 0. So it must be that (a,N) £ B, and there12
exists (c,S) £ G dominating (a,N). If S = N, then (c,N) would also dominate
(0,N)
,
a contradiction. Clearly S must be (2) and c = 1, c > a . So
— J 12 2
((l,c),(2)) £G . This is dominated by ( ( 1 , c +e ) , { 2 ) ) , which must therefore be
2 2
* *
in B. Any agreement that dominates this must be ((l,a ),{2)) with a > c +e .
2 2 2
* *
Therefore, there is ((l,a ),{2)) 6 G, with a > c +e > c - - so it dominates
2 2 2 2
((l,c ),{2)) £ G, a contradiction.
2
The R-CPNE in this example appears unreasonable, since it has player 1
choosing a dominated strategy. If 2 conjectures that 1 will not play a
dominated strategy, 2 should play some a close to 1. The importance of self
enforcing agreements is that they protect a player from being "double-crossed"
but in this example, they prevent players from enjoying mutually beneficial
actions, solely because there is no "best" action of this sort. Were we to
allow in some fashion "near- rational" behavior for the coalition (1,2), we
would be able to describe actions a with a = 1 and a close to 1 as "almost"
-
1 2
self -enforcing, and therefore superior to 0. In the following section, we
extend our approach to allow for such forms of "almost" self -enforcing
agreements
.
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With a slightly more complicated example, we can show that R-CPNE need
not be S-CPNE, even in a game with compact strategies and continuous utility
functions
:
Example 5:
N = (1,2,3,4) , A - [0,l]x{0,l)
i
tya)
- p
x
p
2
p
3
p,[x
2
- iv x2 |]
U
2
(a) = p iP2P 3PJ2x i - x 3 - |x2 -x 3 |]
U(a)-pppp[2x -x - I x -x I (1-x +x ) ]
3
_ r
l
r
2
r
3
r
4 1 2 ' 1 3
' 12
U (a) = pppplx]
H 1 2 3 H M
where x denotes the real number in [0,1] chosen by i, and p e(0,l) the second
i i
component of i's decision. (Think, of this game as an extension of the game in
k 1c k k
example 2: Call any agreement with p=p =p = p=la "participative"12 3 i>
agreement; if all four players agree, players 1-3 play the game in example 2;
otherwise, all players receive 0.)
k k k k
It is obvious that any strategy with p=p= P = p=0is
self -enforcing for N. We shall establish that any such agreement is an R-CPNE
but not a S-CPNE.
To show that any such strategy a is an R-CPNE, note that any dominating
agreement must be participative. However, no participative b is
self -enforcing for N. Suppose otherwise; then it must constitute a Nash
equilibrium, and x - x - x = x, say, while x =1. If x < 1, then any
1 2 3 J 4
participative strategy c with real-valued components (x+e , x+e , x+e , 1) is
self -enforcing for (1,2,3). This is established by arguments analogous to
those in example 2: neither of the first three players can unilaterally
deviate profitably, and neither can any pair-subcoalition of (1,2,3) engineer
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a coordinated deviation that is self -enforcing . So b cannot be self -enforcing
for N, as (b,N) is dominated by (c, (1,2,3)), implying that b cannot be optimal
for (1,2,3). If x = 1, then (b,N) is dominated by (d,{2,3)), where d is a
k kparticipative strategy with x - x - 0, which is optimal for (2,3).
We next show that (a,N) J G in any semi-stable partition. Now (a,N) is
k k kdominated by (e,N) where e is a participative strategy vector and x - x = x
— rr oj 12 3
=» x < 1 and x =1. If (e, N)
€
B then (a,N)
€
G, and we are done.
4
Therefore, suppose that (e,N) e B. If so, there is something in G which
dominates it. It cannot involve singletons, or paired coalitions, neither can
it include player 4. So it must involve the coalition (1,2,3). Further, to be
k k k *
in G , it must involve x - x = x = x where x < x* < 1 . But any such12 3 J
agreement must be in U , by reasoning which is identical to that of example 2.
Therefore (e,N) G U. Contradiction.
The two examples above establish that the recursive and non- recursive
formulations are not identical in all cases. Since the equilibria generated
by a stable partition are S-CPNE, example 5 demonstrates a fortiori that the
characterization in terms of stable partitions is not equivalent to the
recursive formulation.
Since our results seem to be different from those claimed in Greenberg
[1989] it is important to indicate the source of the discrepancy. Greenberg
finds that R-CPNE can be characterized by using stable partitions. The
problem is that he implicitly assumes that a stable partition exists. As we
have seen, this cannot be demonstrated in general, except for finite-player,
finite -action games.
15
III. Extended Agreements
The recursive and non- recursive definitions are equivalent for games with
finite strategy spaces and finite numbers of players. The equivalence breaks
down in other cases. In example 4 equivalence would be restored if we
modified the game by adding strategies which corresponded to the limit points
of the strategy space. But example 5 demonstrates that this proposed
resolution will not work in general. In this section we will examine a
more satisfactory resolution for the case of infinite strategy spaces.
In this section we assume that the set of players is finite and that each
player's utility function U. is continuous on the compact strategy space ^ A..
An extended agreement (a,S) consists of a coalition S C N and a sequence
1 2
of strategies a = (a
,
a
,
...) which satisfies the following conditions:
1: The sequence converges.
k k'
2: For all t
€
S, a = a for all k, k'
.
t t
In other words, an extended agreement is a sequence of coordinated
actions by the members of coalition S, holding the actions of non-members
fixed. Extended agreements include simple agreements as a special case:
identify a simple agreement with an extended agreement in which the sequence
of strategy vectors is constant. Let A denote the set of extended agreements.
An extended agreement (b,T) dominates (a,S) if
(a) TCS
(b) There exists k such that b = a for all j € N\T
j j
(c) lim U (b k ) > lim U (a*) for all ieT.
16
It is useful to note that (b,T) dominates (a,S) implies that it also dominates
(a,V) for any VDT if (a,V) is in A . Dominating agreements are coordinated
deviations from initial agreements: At any step in the process that forms the
initial extended agreement, say k, a subcoalition can agree to break away and
follow their own coordinated deviation.
The definition of a serai-stable partition carries over without
modification, as do the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 establishing the existence
and uniqueness of the semi-stable partition.
A strategy vector a* is an Extended Stable Coalition Proof Nash
Equilibrium (ES-CPNE) if it is the limit of a sequence of strategy vectors a,
where (a,N) is in G for the serai - stable partition of extended agreements.
For finite-player games, there is a recursive definition in extended
agreements analogous to the recursive definition of the previous section:
Recursive Definition of Extended CPNE
:
For any singleton coalition (i), say
that (a,(i)) e A is optimal if there does not exist any (b, {i)) in A which
dominates (a, ( i ) ) .
Having defined optimality for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
define optimality for a coalition S of size k (>2), as follows.
Say that (a,S) e A is self -enforc ing if there does not exist an optimal
(b,T) that dominates (a,S), with T C S.
Say that (a,S) is optimal if it is self -enforcing and there does not
exist any self -enforcing (b,S) that dominates (a,S).
Finally, if N is finite, say that the strategy vector a* is an Extended
Recurs ive -CPNE (ER-CPNE) if it is the limit of a sequence of strategy vectors
a such that extended agreement (a,N) is optimal.
1 7
The next result is the major result of the paper. It says that if we
define Coalition Proof equilibria in terms of extended agreements, then for
all finite player games -- those with infinite strategy spaces as well as
finite strategy spaces -- the recursive and the non-recursive definitions are
equivalent.
Theorem 6: Using extended agreements, there is a unique serai-stable
partition, which is also a stable partition. In this stable partition, (a,S)
6 G if and only if (a,S) is optimal; hence the limit of a is an ER-CPNE if
and only if it is an ES-CPNE.
Proof: See appendix.
A consequence of the proof of this theorem is that there is an
equivalent, somewhat simpler recursive definition.
Corollary : The following definition is equivalent to the other definitions of
Extended CPNE.
Alternative Recursive Definition of Extended CPNE
:
For any singleton
coalition (i), say that all (a,(i)) e A are self -enforcing
.
Having defined self -enforcing for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
define it for a coalition S of size k (k>2) as follows.
Say that (a,S) G A is self -enforcing if there does not exist a self-
enforcing (b,T) that dominates (a,S), with T C S.
Finally, if N is finite, say that the strategy vector a* is an
Extended-CPNE if it is the limit of a sequence a of strategy vectors such that
the extended agreement (a,N) is self -enforcing and not dominated by any self
enforcing agreement.
Proof: See appendix.
It is instructive to use examples 2 and 5 to contrast the extended
equilibrium definition with the initial definitions. In example 2, the unique
extended equilibrium is the point (1,1,1). Although it is not self enforcing,
it is the limit of a sequence of self enforcing agreements (x,x,x) and is the
optimal member of this class. There was no R-CPNE and no S-CPNE.
Example 5 shows the power of our new definition. The fact that the set
of optimal three player agreements is empty allows unreasonable R-CPNE in the
four player game. Our definition of an S-CPNE eliminates these equilibria,
but does not suggest an alternative. The extended equilibrium for this
example is the point (1,1,1,1): it is "almost" self enforcing, and is maximal
among such points.
IV. Games with a Countably Infinite Number of Players
Theorem 1, demonstrating the existence of a semi-stable partition, does
not depend on the number of players in the game being finite. But if there is
an infinite number of players, the semi -stable partition need not be unique.
This fact gives rise to the following definitions:
The strategy vector aeA is a Weakly Stable CPNE if (a,N)eG for some
serai-stable partition of A. It is a Strongly Stable CPNE if (a,N)eG for every
semi-stable partition.
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The following example illustrates the distinction:
Example 6: N = {1,2,3...}; A. = (0,1) for i e N. Thus a strategy vector is
an infinite string of zeros and ones. In this game any strategy vector gives
a payoff of zero to all players, except for strategy vectors listed in the
table below. For a strategy vector x = (x.. ,x_ ,x_
,
. . . ) in the table, the
corresponding payoff vector u = (u. ,u.,u.,...) is indicated to the right:
x
1
- (1 1 1 1 1 1 ...) u
1
- (2,2,2,2,2,2,
x
2
=(100000...) u2 -(1,3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
x
3
= (1 1 1 1 1 ...) u
3
- (1,1,4,4,4,4,
x
4
=(101000...) u4 - (1,1,1,5,5,5,
x =(101010 ...) u = (1,1,1,1,1,1,...
In this game there are two complete stable partitions; in one all the even
numbered strings are Weakly Consistent CPNE, in the other all the odd numbered
strings are Weakly Consistent CPNE. There is no Strongly Consistent CPNE.
00
Note that x is not an equilibrium in either partition.
It might seem a difficult matter to check whether an agreement is in
every semi-stable partition; in fact the procedure for doing so is relatively
simple. This is due to the following theorem:
* * *
Theorem 7
:
There exists a minimal semi-stable partition {G , U , B ) -- that
* * *
is (G
,
U
,
B } is a semi-stable partition such that for every other
semi-stable partition (G, U, B} G c G, and B C B.
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Proof: In the derivation in theorem 1, let 7* be the first ordinal such that
•*• *
G
,_
= G
.
, ,
and let G = G _ B = B . . Note that the set G n will belone to7* 7*+l 7* 7*
the set G in any serai-stable partition, B_ will belong to the B set in any
semi-stable partition, and if for all a < 8
,
G and B belong, respectively to
a a ° J
G and B in all semi-stable partitions, then G and B must as well.B
P P
Thus the minimal semi-stable partition is precisely the semi-stable
partition generated in the procedure of theorem 1. As an immediate
consequence, we have the following characterization:
Corollary : a is a strongly stable CPNE if and only if agreement (a,N) belongs
to some set G where the sets G are defined as follows:
a a
G- is the set of agreements not dominated by any agreement in A.
For a > G is the set of agreements which are dominated by no agreement
in A, except for agreements which are in turn dominated by some agreement in
V " <a -
Note that this is a recursive characterization as well, but unlike the
B-P-W definition, it does not require recursion on the number of members of
the agreement. Thus this new characterization, unlike the B-P-W definition,
is naturally applicable to games with infinite numbers of players. It also
provides a natural hierarchy among equilibria; if a < B, then equilibria in G
are more "salient" than equilibria in G.. When they exist, the strong
P
equilibria (those in G ) are most "salient."
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IV: Summary and Comments
In order to propose yet another modification of yet another solution
concept, the proposer ought to give three sorts of justifications. First, to
demonstrate that it is indeed a modification, the new definition and the
original ought to be posed in such a form that the similarities are apparent.
This we have done by comparing semi-stable partitions with stable partitions,
and extended agreements with agreements.
Second, the proposer ought to show in examples that the new solution
concept yields more "intuitive" results than does the original. We have done
this as well: Compare the equilibrium extended agreement with any of the
initial equilibrium agreements for example 5.
Third, and in our view most important, the proposer ought to demonstrate
that theorems that hold for the original definition hold with greater
generality or more regularity with the new definition. The result we have
examined is the fact that Coalition Proof Equilibrium as recursively defined
can be characterized by a stability criterion. For the original definition
this is true when action sets are finite, but not when they are infinite. For
our definition with extended agreements the characterization holds generally.
When we extend the solution in extended agreements to situations with
countably infinite numbers of players, semi-stable partitions will no longer
be unique, leading to weak and strong versions of the definition in terms of
semi- stability
. In this case, we would argue that the strong version has the
greater claim to our attention, if for no other reason than that theorem 1
gives us an explicit method for finding the solutions. This method can be
given the following interpretation: An agreement is a good one if 1) no other
agreement blocks it (strong equilibria would fall in this category) or if 2)
9?
no agreement blocks it except for agreements that are blocked by agreements of
the first kind, or if 3) no agreement blocks it except agreements that are
blocked by agreements of the first or second kind, and so forth.
Future papers will apply these two modifications to other solution
concepts
.
Appendix
In general dominance is not a transitive relation. Nonetheless, for both
agreements and extended agreements the following is valid:
Lemma A.l: If (c,S) dominates (b,S) and (b,S) dominates (a,T) then (c,S)
dominates (a,T).
Proof
:
Parts (i) and (iii) of the definition of dominance are immediately
verified. Part (ii) obvious in the case of simple agreements; for extended
k k k k
agreements it is nearly so: if b. =• a. for i
€
S, then c. = a. for i G S.B
Note : In particular, by setting S = T we have transitivity on any set of
agreements involving a fixed coalition.
Proof of Theorem 2
:
Consider any two semi-stable partitions {G.,U B ) and {G U_,B „).
Claim 1
:
For any i € N,
(a, {I}) G G
x
o (a, (i)) 6 G
2
and (a, {i}) € B o (a, (i)) B
2
Proof: If (a,{i}) G G^ then it cannot be dominated by any agreement. For
any (b,(ij) which dominates it must be in B But then (b,(i)) must be
dominated by (c,{i)) in G which then also dominates (a,(i)), a contradiction.
Since (a, (i)) is not dominated by any agreement it must also be in G„ .
Reversing the argument, (a, (i)) G G « (a, (i)) G G
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Suppose (a, (i)) € B Then there exists (b, (i)) in G which dominates
it. Since (b, (i)) must also be in G it follows that (a, (i)) is in B„.
Reversing the argument, the claim is established.
Claim 2: Suppose for all coalitions T with #T < k-1, it is true that
(a, T) G G
L
o (a, T) G G
2
and (a, T) G B o (a, T) B
then the same is true for coalitions of size k
Proof : Suppose for T of size k, (a,T) G G (a,T) € G Then (a,T) is
dominated by (b,V) which is not in B 9 . If V is a proper subset of T, then the
induction hypothesis implies that (b,V) is not in B ' contradicting (a,T) e
The other possibility is that V = T, in which case, (b,T) not in B
dominates (a,T). Now (a,T) e G implies (b,T) e B So (b,T) must be
dominated by some (c,W) G G W cannot equal T; otherwise (c,W) would also
dominate (a,T). W c T implies (c,W) g G implying (b,T) G B a
contradiction. We conclude that (a,T) G G implies (a,T) G G
Suppose (a,T) G B Then there exists (b,W) G G which dominates it. By
the above reasoning, (b,W) ^ G
,
so (a,T) G B
Reversing the argument completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
:
The proof proceeds through a series of lemmas. We begin with a notational
convention, some definitions, and a preliminary observation.
Notational Convention: If d is a convergent sequence of strategy
vectors, we will use the notation d to represent the limit strategy vector.
For x, y in IR , let x > y mean x. > y. for i = 1, . . n. We will say set
A dominates x if a > x for some a in A. x is an upper bound for A if A does
not dominate x.
Observation: If A is bounded and A dominates x, then there is a point z in
the closure of A such that z > x and z is an upper bound for A.
Proof of Observation : There exists a in A such that a > x. Define the set B
to be points in the closure of A such that ra. > a. for i = 1, . .n. B is a
non-empty, compact set. Pick z in B to maximize 2.Z..
Lemma A , 2
:
For any non-empty, bounded set A in IR , either there is a point x
in A which is an upper bound for A or there is a sequence of strictly
increasing points in A whose limit is an upper bound for A.
Proof : Define a sequence recursively as follows:
Given a.
1
,
if it is an upper bound for A, stop. Otherwise, using the
above observation, pick z. > a. , which is an upper bound for A and which is
l l -
1
the limit of a sequence of points in A. From that sequence, we can pick a.
such that a. is strictly greater than a. , and the distance between a. and z.
l J b l-l ii
is less than 2
If the process terminates the theorem is proved. If the process does not
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terminate, take a convergent subsequence of z.'s. The corresponding a.'s form
the desired sequence.
The key result is the following lemma: it rules out "openness" of the set
of self -enforcing agreements.
Lemma A. 3
:
Suppose (a, T) is not optimal, but is self enforcing (if #T > 2)
then there exists (c, T) which is optimal and dominates (a, T)
.
Proof : The result is obvious for a singleton coalition. For #T > 2
,
let
£ - {(d,T) self enforcing d. =» a. for i
€ T}
In other words any self -enforcing agreement which dominates (a,T) must be
in £ . Consider the set Im £ , the image in IK , the space of payoffs for
members of T, from the limit strategy vectors for all extended agreements in
t5
. Note that an extended agreement in "Q is optimal if and only if its image
is an upper bound in Im £ . Applying lemma A. 2 to Im S, we can conclude that
either there is an optimal agreement that dominates (a,T) or there is a
sequence of extended agreements with strictly increasing utility for all
members of T, whose utility converges to an upper bound. This sequence of
extended agreements will have a subsequence
(d(l),T), (d(2),T), (d(3),T) ...
such that
d*(l), d*(2), d*(3), . . .
is a convergent sequence (recall the notational convention). Call the limit
strategy vector c .
Now choose a sequence of strategy vectors, one from each d(i), such that
this sequence also converges to c . Call this "diagonalized" sequence c.
Agreement (c,T) dominates (a,T) and no element of t? dominates (c,T). If (c,T)
is self -enforcing, we are done.
Suppose (c,T) is not self enforcing. Then it is dominated by an optimal
agreement (f ,V) , with V c T. That means that all members of V strictly prefer
* *
f to c
,
and that for some k
f
k
= c
k
for all i € V
i 1
k k' k
But for some d(m) and some k'
,
c = d (m) . And for all i 6 V, f
.
k'
f. . That is to say, for k'
f
k
'= d
k
' (m) for all i € V.
And since all members of T prefer c to d (m) , all members of V prefer f to
d (m) . That is to say, (f,V) dominates (d (m),T), contradicting the
assumption that all agreements in £ were self -enforcing.
Lemma A.A_j_ An optimal extended agreement is not dominated by any self
enforcing extended agreement.
Proof
:
Suppose otherwise that (a,T) is optimal and dominated by a
9R
self -enforcing (b,S). Since one optimal extended agreement cannot be dominated
by another, (b,S) must not be optimal. But then by the preceding lemma there
exists an optimal (c,S) which dominates (b,S). And by Lemma A.l, (c,S)
dominates (a,T), a contradiction.
Lemma A 5j_ For any serai stable partition, (a,T) e G implies (a,T) is optimal.
Proof : Identical to the proof for simple agreements in theorem 2 of the text.
Lemma A 6j_ Suppose we have a semi-stable partition with the property that
for all coalitions T of size not exceeding k-1 (> 2), (a,T) e U implies that
(a,T) is self -enforcing. Then (a,T) is optimal implies (a,T) € G.
Proof
:
If (a,T) is in U it is dominated by (b,V) in U. Since the size of V
is no greater than the size of T, (b,V) is self enforcing by the hypothesis of
the lemma. Then by lemma A. 4, (a,T) is not optimal.
If (a,T) is in B, it is dominated by (b,V) in G. By lemma A. 5 (b,V) is
optimal, therefore (a,T) is not optimal.
Lemma A 7j_ Given a semi-stable partition and a coalition T (with #T > 2)
,
(a,T) G U implies that (a,T) is self -enforcing
.
Proof : Suppose #T =» 2 . Then (a,T) not self -enforcing , means that there is a
player i in T such that (a,T) is dominated by an optimal (c,(i)). For a
single -player agreement to be optimal, it cannot be dominated by any
agreement, and therefore (c,(i)) e G, contradicting (a,T) G U.
Now suppose the result is true for any T with #T < k - 1, and consider
the case where #T = k. If (a,T) e U is not self -enforcing then there exists an
optimal (b,W), wich W c T, such that (b,W) dominates (a,T). Since #W < k - 1,
application of the preceding lemma implies that (b,W) is in G, contradicting
the assertion that (a,T) G U.
Lemma A 8j_ (a,T) is optimal if and only if (a,T) G G in the semi-stable
partition.
Proof
:
Combining the two preceding lemmas we conclude that (a,T) optimal
implies (a,T) G G. The reverse implication is lemma A. 5. The uniqueness of
the semi-stable partition follows from the fact that the set of optimal
agreements is constructed without any reference to stable partitions.
Lemma A 9j_ U is empty; i.e. the semi stable partition is stable.
Proof: Suppose (a,S) G U. By lemma A7
,
(a,S) is self -enforcing. By the
preceding lemma, (a,S)
€
G implies (a,S) is not optimal. Thus there is (c,S)
which is optimal and which dominates (a,S). By the preceding lemma (c,S) G G
dominates (a,S) G U, a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary :
The equivalence follows from the following fact: (a,T) is self enforcing
if and only if it is not dominated by any self enforcing (b,S) with S C T.
"If" follows from the fact that optimal agreements are a subset of self
enforcing agreements. To prove "Only if" we show that if (a,T) is dominated
by a self enforcing (b,S) with S c T, then it is dominated by an optimal
(c,S). This follows by applying lemma A. 3 and lemma A.l.
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Footnotes
See also Dutta et al. [5],
2
In other words, the dominion of G is precisely the complement of G. The
definition would be unaffected by writing it with one-way rather than two-way
implications
.
3
In a semi-stable partition it is possible for the good set to be empty (and
therefore the bad set as well). This is the case in example 1 above. However
the good set will not be empty if the payoff functions are continuous and
individual players' strategy sets are closed. In the definition of a
semi-stable partition, unlike the definition of a stable partition, the double
implications are crucial.
4
This proof is a special case of the existence proof for subsolutions in Roth
(1976). If there are a finite number of players, then the proof does not
require transfinite induction.
Again, having an open set of strategies is not necessary; more complicated
examples can be derived with compact strategy spaces and continuous payoffs.
A natural extension of this approach will handle games with discontinuous
payoffs by modifying (iii) in the definition of dominance as follows:
k klim inf U.(b ) > lim sup U.(a ) .
To handle non-compact action spaces as well, it will be necessary to
substitute raonotonic sequences for convergent sequences of strategy vectors,
and to use the overtaking criterion for comparison of limit payoffs.
An alternate proof of uniqueness is provided in theorem 6.
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